By Natasha Akpoti
The purpose of wheeling is to benefit the end-consumer. This means for the system to be implemented there has to be a realistic indication that the consumer will benefit. This is the fundamental basis of the competition, or “anti-trust” law. One can infer, although wheeling may be conceivable in a state or region it may not be in the “best interests” of the consumer to liberalise the market. Rather, there needs to be consideration of the wider impact. This is especially so in a developing country, where the government may have the only capability to provide the lines of transmission and the provision of electricity. As this analysis will illustrate there are greater problems when the suppliers, distributers and transmitters are the same organisation (especially after a rash liberalisation), because there is no incentive to allow other players on the grid. Thus, proper consideration of the whole model has to be undertaken; whereby a slow period of liberalisation and the development of separate, distinct organisations may be necessary. Even so, it will be highlighted if the only player to provide the service effectively and efficiently is the government (during a period of development); then liberalisation is not the best approach. Also, in the limited circumstances that wheeling will increase the cost of electricity to the end-consumer, the act of wheeling has no conceivable benefit, which means it should be avoided.
In short, this research will illustrate that retail wheeling of the energy markets, as opposed to other liberalisation of the markets, is complex. This is because it centres on a core need – energy. Therefore, if the justification of retail wheeling is in the precepts of competition law, the core concept of benefiting the customer must prevail.